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INTERSTATE JURISDICTIONAL COMPACTS:
A NEW THEORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
The Interstate Compact Clause' of the Constitution permits states,
subject to congressional consent,2 to enter into agreements on a
1. The Clause provides that, "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress
... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S. Const. art. I, §
10, cl. 3. Although stated in the negative, the clause is not a "denial of the power of
two States to enter into a compact . . . with one another, but only [places] a condi-
tion [of the consent of Congress] upon the exercise of such power." Stearns v. Min-
nesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900); accord, West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341
U.S. 22, 27 (1951); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724 (1838);
see Celler, Congress, Compacts, and Interstate Authorities, 26 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 682, 683 (1961); Note, Legal Problems Relating to Interstate Compacts, 23
Iowa L. Rev. 618, 618 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Legal Problems]; Note, The Inter-
state Compact -A Survey, 27 Temp. L.Q. 320, 322 (1953) [hereinafter cited as A
Survey]; 37 Mich. L. Rev. 129, 130 (1938). The flexibility of the Compact Clause,
the growth of our nation and the consequent increase in regional problems, and the
judicial favor accorded the Compact Clause have all resulted in a steady increase in
the use of compacts throughout the history of the United States. Between 1783 and
1920, 36 compacts were adopted; between 1921 and 1940, 20 additional compacts
were adopted; and between 1941 and 1975, over 100 compacts were adopted. F.
Zimmermann & M. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts ix (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Law and Use]. The Supreme Court has suggested on more than
one occasion that litigating states should attempt to resolve their differences by com-
pact. E.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921); Minnesota v. Wiscon-
sin, 252 U.S. 273, 283 (1920); Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1909);
see A Survey, supra, at 327. Moreover, the Interstate Compact Clause is often
touted as a cure-all for regional problems. "The imaginative adaptation of the com-
pact idea should add considerably to the resources available to statesmen in the
solution of problems presented by the growing interdependence, social and eco-
nomic, of groups of States forming distinct regions." Frankfurter & Landis, The Com-
pact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J.
685, 707-08, 729 (1925); see In re Waterfront Comm'n, 39 N.J. Super. 33, 42, 120
A.2d 504, 508-09 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1956); R. Leach & R. Sugg, Jr., The Admin-
istration of Interstate Compacts 5-6, 213 (1959); F. Zimmerman & M. Wendell,
The Interstate Compact Since 1925, at 11 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Since 1925];
Celler, supra, at 683; Leach, The Federal Government and Interstate Compacts, 29
Fordham L. Rev. 421, 423-25 (1961) [hereinafter cited as The Federal Government];
Leach, Interstate Authorities in the United States, 26 Law & Contemp. Prob. 666,
678 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Interstate Authorities]. See generally W. Barton, In-
terstate Compacts in the Political Process (1965).
2. See note 1 supra. Not all interstate agreements, however, require congres-
sional consent. Only compacts that result in a "combination tending to the increase
of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States" require such consent. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U.S. 503, 519 (1893) (dicta). Although this dicta was not formally accepted by the
Supreme Court until 1976, see New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976),
it was cited with approval on many occasions. E.g., North Carolina v. Tennessee,
235 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1914); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 24648 (1900); see
Since 1925, supra note 1, at 34; Legal Problems, supra note 1, at 620-21 & n.15; A
Survey, supra note 1, at 322; Note, Some Legal and Practical Problems of the Inter-
state Compact, 45 Yale L.J. 324, 327 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Practical Problems].
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variety of topics.' The Constitution does not specifically define the
nature and scope of the Compact Clause.4 The power it gives to the
states, however, is often analogized to the treaty-making power of
3. Boundary adjustments have been the most frequent occasions for invoking
the Compact Clause. W. Barton, supra note 1, at 3; Since 1925, supra note 1, at
8-13; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 698; LaRue, Interstate Cooperation and
an Interstate Judiciary, 27 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 6 (1970); Practical Problems,
supra note 2, at 325. A list of the numerous border compacts prior to 1925 is con-
tained in Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 1, at 735-48. This list has been updated
through 1970 in The Council of State Governments, Interstate Compacts, 1783-1970:
A Compilation 7-8 (1971) [hereinafter cited as A Compilation]. The Compact Clause
has also been used to create bi-state agencies with jurisdiction over interstate areas,
see Joint Resolution of August 23, 1921, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 Stat. 174, to build
bridges over boundary streams, see, e.g., New York-Vermont Bridge Agreement of
1927, Joint Resolution of February 16, 1928, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 45 Stat. 120, as
amended by Joint Resolution of May 31, 1945, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 59 Stat. 227;
Pennsylvania-New Jersey Toll Bridge Compact, Act of August 30, 1935, Pub. L. No.
74-411, 49 Stat. 1058, as amended by Act of August 4, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-355, 61
Stat. 752; Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority Compact of 1937, Act
of July 28, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-220, 50 Stat. 538, and to regulate water use and
pollution, see, e.g., New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact, Act
of July 31, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-292, 61 Stat. 682; Interstate Sanitation Compact,
Joint Resolution of August 27, 1935, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 Stat. 932; Ohio River
Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Act of July 11, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-739, 54 Stat.
752. A list of all interstate compacts is contained in A Compilation, supra.
4. "The records of the Constitutional Convention, however, are barren of any
clue as to the precise contours of the agreements and compacts governed by the
Compact Clause." United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S.
452, 460-61 (1978) (footnote omitted). The Framers of the 'Constitution took the vir-
tually identical compact provision contained in the Articles of Confederation and in-
serted it into the new Constitution. R. Leach & R. Sugg, Jr., supra note 1, at 4-5;
The Federal Government, supra note 1, at 421. On July 25, 1787, the Constitutional
Convention created a Committee of Detail composed of John Rutledge, James Wil-
son, Edmund Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham and Oliver Elsworth. The Convention
then adjourned until August 6 to allow the Committee to prepare a draft. 2 M.
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 97, 128 (2d ed. 1937). Sec-
tion 10 of the Committee's first draft provided that "[n]o State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance (or) Confederation with any foreign Power nor witht. Const. Of U.S.
into any agreemt. or compact wh . . . another State or Power." Id. at 169 (abbrevia-
tions in original). On August 6, the Committee submitted a second draft to the Con-
vention providing in pertinent part that "[n]o State, without the consent of the
Legislature of the United States, shall.., enter into any agreement or compact with
another state .... Id. at 187. The Committee of Style, created to revise the draft,
reported on September 12, id. at 590, but nothing was said about Art. 1, § 10, which
contained the Compact Clause and was incorporated into the Constitution as
approved on September 17. The records of the ratification debates also shed very
little light. James Madison declared only that the portion of Art. I, § 10 containing
the Compact Clause fell "within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have
been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark." The Feder-
alist No. 44, at 302 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See generally Weinfeld, What
Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"?, 3
U. Chi. L. Rev. 453 (1936).
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independent nations, 5 which allows sovereign states to make agree-
ments on virtually any subject.6
Recently, in Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultrj Inc.,- the Second
Circuit implied that Interstate Compacts could be used to expand
jurisdictional boundaries.8 In Intermeat, the plaintiff sequestered the
defendant's debt pursuant to New York's jurisdictional attachment
statute.' Arguing that he lacked the requisite contacts with New
York, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 0 The court denied the defendant's motion, deeming the
shipping of goods into Port Newark, New Jersey a contact xvith New
York State because, although Port Newark is outside the territorial
boundaries of the forum state, it is under the jurisdiction of the Port
of New York Authority," a bi-state agency created by interstate
5. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104
(1938) ("The compact . . . means [of settling interstate controversies] adapts to our
Union of sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of independent sovereign
nations"); see Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 525 (1893); Rhode Island v. Mas-
sachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 724 (1838); Since 1925, supra note 1, at 31-32. See
generally Abel, Interstate Cooperation as a Child, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 203, 206 (194T);
Note, A Reconsideration of the Nature of Interstate Compacts, 35 Colum. L. Rev.
76, 76-77 (1935) [hereinafter cited as A Reconsideration]; Practical Problems. supra
note 2, at 329.
6. For example, in the United States the treaty power is without any express
constitutional limitations. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); see B.
Schwartz, Constitutional Law § 3.16, at 102 (2d ed. 1979). The Supreme Court,
however, has stated that "a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if
it be in violation of that instrument." The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616,
620-21 (1870); accord, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); see B. Schwartz,
supra, § 3.16, at 102; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 4-4, at 169-70 (1978).
7. 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978). In Intermeat, the court considered the effect of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), an on quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in New York.
575 F.2d at 1021-22. In Shaffer, the Supreme Court held that the "minimum con-
tacts" standard of due process established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), should also be used to determine whether jurisdiction
based on the attachment of property is constitutionally acceptable. 433 U.S. at 211-
12.
8. 575 F.2d at 1019 n.1, 1023.
9. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 314, 315, 5201, 6202 (McKinney 1972). These sta-
tutes authorize the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
based on the attachment of a debt owed to the defendant from a debtor found in
New York. Id. §§ 314, 315, 5201, 6202.
10. 575 F.2d at 1018-19.
11. Id. at 1019 n.1, 1023. The court's analysis contravenes an earlier holding of a
New York County Civil Court. In Bunge v. C & N Truck Leasing, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d
143, 329 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Civ. Ct. 1972), the plaintiff's car was struck by the defend-
ant's vehicle while at the toll plaza on the New Jersey side of the George Washing-
ton Bridge, which is owned and operated by the Port of New York Authority. Plain-
tiff sued in New York. Defendant raised the affirmative defense that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 144, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 459. Alleging that the compact
creating the Port Authority vested both New York and New Jersey with jurisdiction
1981] 1099
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compact. 2 A logical extension of this rationale would enable states to
enact compacts specifically providing courts of both states with juris-
diction over individuals present and acts occurring within the other's
territory.
This concept of a jurisdictional "bulge" created by interstate com-
pact is especially interesting in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'" in which
the Court limited the utility of long-arm statutes by restrictively in-
terpreting the nature of the minimum contacts constitutionally neces-
sary to allow courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. 14 Because interstate jurisdictional compacts might pro-
over the Bridge, plaintiff moved to dismiss this defense. The court dismissed the
complaint against the defendant for want of personal jurisdiction. In doing so, the
court noted that plaintiff's theory, "while novel, is not without appeal but the plain-
tiff has not submitted any authority to support it." Id. at 144, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
See also Clarke v. Ackerman, 243 A.D. 446, 450, 278 N.Y.S. 75, 79-80 (1st Dept.
1935) (New York-New Jersey Compact of 1834 does not vest New York State courts
with jurisdiction over accident occurring on the New Jersey side of the George
Washington Bridge); Preisler v. Velasquez, 65 Misc. 2d 703, 704-05, 318 N.Y.S.2d
977, 979 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (same).
12. The state legislation creating the Port Authority is reported at N.Y. Uncon-
sol. Laws (65) §§ 6401-6423 (McKinney 1979), and N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:1 to :23
(West 1963). Congress consented to the interstate compact by the Joint Resolution of
August 23, 1921, 67th Cong. 1st Sess., 42 Stat. 174.
13. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). World-Wide Volkswagen arose out of an automobile
accident in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The plaintiffs had bought a new Audi from the petition-
ers in Massena, New York. Id. at 288. The respondents subsequently drove their
Audi to their new home in Arizona. While traveling through Oklahoma, the
plaintiff's wife and children were severely burned when the Audi's gas tank exploded
after being struck from behind. The plaintiff brought a products liability action in an
Oklahoma state court. Id. Defendants entered special appearances, seeking to defeat
the exercise of jurisdiction over them. Id. The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351
(Okla. 1978), which held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dants was authorized by Oklahoma's long-arm statute. Okla. Stat. tit. 12,
§1701.03(a)(4)(1980). The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Okla-
homa did not have jurisdiction over the defendants. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 299 (1980). The parameters of this decision are unclear.
Some commentators have attacked the decision as unduly restrictive of state court
jurisdiction, while others feel the Court's reevaluation of jurisdiction was long over-
due. Compare Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Juris-
dictional Theory, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19, 53 (1980) ("The Court's present system of juris-
diction . . . ignores present economic and social reality") with Louis, The Grasp of
Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 407, 409 (1980)
("The Court's new approach is a fair and workable one").
14. Louis, supra note 13, at 428. ("In effect, what the Court has done .. is to
turn the clock back to an earlier time when jurisdiction . . .was concerned more
with the defendant's conduct and less with notions of social welfare and convenient
risk allocation"); see Kamp, supra note 13, at 45, 47, 51; Ripple & Murphy, World-
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vide a partial solution to some of the problems engendered by the
Court's restrictive stance on long-arm jurisdiction," this Note con-
tends that contiguous states can, and should, provide for concurrent
jurisdiction through interstate compacts.
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT
The United States is an economically open, highly mobile, indus-
trial society. 6 It is also a federation of fifty distinct polities, each
with its own judicial system.1 7 Thus, although the federal system
allows people to move freely about the country, it also restricts the
state's exercise of jurisdiction over them."
The inability of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants has plagued our federal system since its inception.' 9
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reflections 6n the Road Ahead, 56 Notre
Dame Law. 65, 78-81 (1980); Sorg, World-Wide Volkswagen: Has the United States
Supreme Court Taken the Illinois Civil Practice Act Section 17-1(b) Out of the Cray
Zone?, 1980 S. IMI. U.L.J. 137, 143; Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Products Liabil-
ity Actions: An 'Effect Test' Analysis of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
45 Alb. L. Rev. 179, 180 (1980) [hereinafter cited as An Effect Test]; Comment,
Federalism, Due Process and Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1341, 1360 n.146 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Federalism]; Note, Specific Jurisdiction: Can the Fourth Circuit Approach Survive
Woodson?, 32 S.C.L. Rev. 379, 395-97 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Specific
Jurisdiction]; 4 Am. J. Trial Advocacy 126, 126 (1980); 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1075,
1080 (1980); 49 U. Mo.-K.C. L. Rev. 78, 80 (1980); 20 Washburn L.J. 137, 144-45
(1980).
15. See notes 50-59 infra and accompanying text.
16. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). "The
economic interdependence of the States was foreseen and desired by the Framers [of
the Constitution]. In the Commerce Clause, they provided that the Nation was to be
a common market, a 'free trade unit' in which the States are debarred from acting as
separable economic entities." id.; see H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S.
525, 538 (1949); Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 241, 246-47. A result of the social and economic unity of the United States
is the vast amount of travel and business occurring across state lines. See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 293 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
222-23 (1957); Hazard, supra, at 246. Americans also have a constitutional right to
travel from state to state, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969); Ed-
wards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941), and a legal right to project themselves
commercially into all parts of the nation. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 409 (1948)
(Frankfiurter, J., concurring).
17. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) C'[T]he
Framers [of the Constitution] ... intended that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try [cases]
in their courts"); Hazard, supra note 16, at 246-47. ('politically [the United States] is
... a federation of distinct polities . .. requir[ing] rules for choice of law and juris-
dictional rules as among separate sovereigns').
18. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
19. See LaRue, supra note 3, at 8. "The jurisdictional problem in the United
States is distinctive because, while the country is socially and economically
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Part of the problem was that the traditional presence theory of
jurisdiction' made no allowance for the open, mobile nature of the
United States." Under the presence theory, articulated in Pennoyer
v. Neff,"2 jurisdiction was premised upon the defendant's physical
presence within the territorial boundaries of the state.3 A state court
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless that
defendant was served with process while within the territorial bound-
aries of the forum state.u
As the United States developed, state boundaries diminished in
commercial importance, and the fictional corporate entity became the
predominant form of business organization.' The Supreme Court
took the view that a corporation existed as a legal person only in the
state of its incorporation r and, therefore, could be sued only ii that
state.27  As the nation's economy developed, however, it became
apparent that corporations would not confine their activities to the
state of their incorporation.' Consequently, the presence theory was
essentially a unitary state, legally and politically it is in many respects a federation of
distinct polities. It is this conjunction of circumstances that is peculiar .... The
peculiar features of the jurisdictional problem in the United States, then, is that our
national economic and social unity is conducive to the full panoply of substantive
transactions found internally in a unitary state but our political plurality requires...
jurisdictional rules as among separate sovereigns." Hazard, supra note 16, at 246-47.
"The jurisdictional problem exists precisely because there is no single tribunal that
has exclusive jurisdiction in the territorial sense." Id. at 265.
20. The presence theory posits that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory," and that "no State
can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled, Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977); see Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353
(1913); Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 569, 570-72 (1958) (footnote omitted from title). Justice Holmes succinctly
stated the basic premise of the presence theory in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90
(1917), when he stated that "[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." Id. at
91.
21. See notes 25-32 infra and accompanying text.
22. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23. 95 U.S. at 722.
24. D. Siegel, Handbook on New York Practice § 59, at 61 (1978); 4 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1064, at 209 (1969).
25. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963); 4 C. Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1066, at 218.
26. Louisville C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 588-59 (1844);
Bank of Augusta v. Earle 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839); 4 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 24, § 1066, at 217.
27. E.g., Louisville C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558-59
(1844); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839); see 4 C. Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1066, at 217; Young, The Nationality of a Juristic
Person, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1908).
28. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963); 4 C. Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1066, at 218.
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unable to reflect the reality of interstate business.' It also precluded
states from obtaining jurisdiction over individuals whose actions
within the state gave rise to a cause of action, but who were beyond
the territorial boundaries of the state at the time of suit.,,
These problems were aggravated by the economic and technologi-
cal advances of the twentieth century.3" "As technological progress
. . . increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for
jurisdiction over nonresidents [underwent] a similar increase." In
response, the Supreme Court, in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington," replaced the antiquated Pennoyer test with a standard
that permits states to exert jurisdiction over those not physically pre-
sent within its boundaries.' The Court held that
29. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, §§ 1065-1066, at 211-24. Hazard,
supra note 16, at 272; Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 909, 917 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Decelopnwnts]. To inject flexibility into
jurisdictional standards the courts turned to legal fictions. 4 C. %%'right & A. Miller,
supra note 24, §§ 1065-66, at 211-24; Forde, The Emergence of Metropolitan Centers
as Litigation Centers for the "Big Case": New Concepts in Federal and State Court
Jurisdiction, 2 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 1, 4-5 (1968); Hazard, supra note 16, at
272-73; Kurland, supra note 20, at 574-86; Ripple & Murphy, supra note 14, at 70.
One such fiction was that a corporation doing business in a state was "present" in the
state and therefore subject to that state's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rosenberg Bros. &
Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517 (1923); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v.
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579, 583 (1914). Another fiction involved automobile consent statutes, under
which a nonresident motorist, by using a state's highways, was deemed to have
appointed a particular state official as his agent for receipt of legal process, thereby
meeting the presence standard of Pennoyer. See, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S.
13, 15 (1928); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927).
30. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1065, at 213.
31. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 193
(5th Cir. 1980); Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244, 2050 (Utah 1980) (Ste-
wart, J., concurring); 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1065, at 211. Kamp,
supra note 13, at 31; Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolu-
tionary Process, 54 Notre Dame Law. 587, 592, 595-96 (1979); Ripple & Murphy,
supra note 14, at 70; Developments, supra note 29, at 916-17; Specific Jurisdiction,
supra note 14, at 379-80; 30 Drake L. Rev. 171, 172-73 (1980); 49 U.M.-K.C. L.
Rev. 78, 81 (1980).
32. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); see Poyner v. Erma Werke
GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 121 (1980), Dotson
v. Fluor Corp., 492 F. Supp. 313, 317 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Roger N. Joyce & Assocs.
v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (E.D. Ark. 1980); note 6 supra.
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
34. See notes 35-39 infra and accompanying text. In International Shoe, a Dela-
ware corporation challenged the power of a Washington state court to hear a suit
against the corporation involving unpaid contributions to the state's unemployment
compensation fund. The Supreme Court held that although the defendant corpora-
tion had no office in Washington and did not deliver goods or stockpile merchandise
there, the defendant had sufficient contacts with Washington to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction because its salesmen's activities in the state were "systematic and con-
tinuous." Id. at 320.
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due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."'
International Shoe's liberalization of jurisdictional standards re-
sulted in the enactment of many long-arm statutes. These statutes
typically permit the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents who
35. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)), The Court,
however, did not indicate what activity constitutes minimum contacts. The jurisdic-
tional cases decided subsequent to International Shoe, McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and Hanson v. Denclda, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), shed
very little light on the precise meaning of minimum contacts. See Nordenberg, supra
note 31, at 613; Ripple & Murphy, supra note 14, at 72; An Effect Test, supra note
14, at 184 n.30. Hanson has been severely criticized by commentators. E.g., Hazard,
supra note 16, at 244; see Kamp, supra note 13, at 34; Louis, supra note 13, at 408,
412; Nordenberg, supra note 31, at 616; An Effect Test, supra note 14, at 184 n.30.
In retrospect, Hanson was notable for its anticipation of the Court's current concern
with the territorial limitations on state court jurisdiction. See World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). Hanson held that a defendant,
to be subject to the jurisdiction of a court, must have "purposefully avail[ed itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." 357 U.S. at 253. The
Hanson court noted that the "restrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of state courts]
are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They
are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." Id.
at 251.
36. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 243. See generally Cur-
rie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois,
1963 U. II. L.F. 533. Because the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the scope
of the requisite minimum contacts, see note 31 supra, it was left to state courts and
legislatures to set the parameters. Not surprisingly, they tended toward a liberal
construction. See, e.g., Ladd v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 456 F. Supp. 422, 424-
25 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (jurisdiction over a foreign corporation upheld on the basis of the
defendant's maintenance of toll free telephone number listings in directories of six
Tennessee cities, the defendant's advertisements in publications circulated in Ten-
nessee, regular calls to Tennessee by defendant's sales personnel, and sale of defen-
dant's tickets by independent travel agents); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.,
100 Ariz. 251, 253, 413 P.2d 732, 733 (1966) (jurisdiction upheld when foreign cor-
poration's only contact with forum state was injury caused by product); Buckeye Boil-
er Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 897-98, 458 P.2d 57, 60-61, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113, 116-17 (1969) (same); Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 I11. 2d 432, 435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762 (1961) (same). "By 1975, state long arm
jurisdiction . . .had enjoyed three decades of unimpeded growth towards, and argu-
ably sometimes beyond, the limits of due process. Furthermore, this inexorable
growth process was one the states inherently favored and were, therefore, unlikely to
stunt voluntarily." Louis, supra note 13, at 409 (footnotes omitted); see 4 C. Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 248; Payne, Jurisdiction In Personan: World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 15 Forum 1023, 1023 (1980); Ripple & Murphy, sup-
ra note 14, at 72; 49 U. Mo.-K.C. L. Rev. 78, 80-81 (1980). See generally Silberman,
Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 79-90 (1978).
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conduct business within the state,3 or who engage in specifically de-
fined activities within ' or without the state 4 that have consequences
within the state. This statutory expansion of jurisdiction was regarded
as a "healthy and natural (trend] in a mobile, industrialized
society." Long-arm statutes encourage the joinder of all parties to a
dispute, an invaluable aid in multi-party litigation." They also pro-
vide plaintiffs with a convenient forum, thereby allowing many in-
juries to be redressed that had previously been uneconomical to
litigate.42 Although the Court never expressly validated all aspects of
comprehensive long-arm jurisdiction, commentators viewed the
Court's silence as approval. 3
Although the developments that encouraged the liberalization of
jurisdictional standards have accelerated in the last three decades,"
the ability to exercise long-arm jurisdiction has been curtailed by re-
cent decisions of the Supreme Court.' In World-Wide Volkswagen
37. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81); Idaho
Code Ann. §§ 5-514, 5-515 (1979); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.28.185 Supp. 1981; see
4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 243.
38. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b), (c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Idaho
Code Ann. § 5-514 (1979); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.28.185 (Supp. 1981); 4 C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 243.
39. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4(e)(2) (1973); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(1)()
(West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302(a) (MeKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980-81);
see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 243.
40. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 243.
41. Id. at 244; D. Siegel, supra note 24, § 85, at 96. Long-arm statutes increase
the jurisdictional reach of the courts, thereby increasing the number of individuals
and corporations potentially subject to the jurisdiction of such courts. Hence, long-
arm statutes make it easier to obtain jurisdiction over joined parties.
42. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 244; Comment, Personal
Jurisdiction in Nebraska: The Need for a Long Arm Statute, 45 Neb. L. Rev. 166,
167 (1966); 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1585, 1598 (1972).
43. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 248-49."[Sltates ...
enact[ed] and extend[ed] their long arm statutes under the Court's silent but
seemingly approving gaze." Louis, supra note 13, at 408.
44. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1980); see
Roger N. Joyce & Assocs. v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (E.D. Ark.
1980). "Statistics help illustrate the amazing expansion in mobility since International
Shoe. The number of revenue passenger-miles flown on domestic and international
flights increased by nearly three orders of magnitude between 1945 (450 million) and
1976 (179 billion). Automobile vehicle-miles (including passenger cars, buses, and
trucks) driven in the United States increased by a relatively modest 500% during the
same period, growing from 250 billion in 1945 to 1,409 billion in 1976." World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 308 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
45. E.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). "The Supreme Court's four most recent
cases on . . .jurisdiction . . .have created a new analytical structure for the deter-
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Corp. v. Woodson,46 the Court restrictively defined the scope of
minimum contacts necessary for jurisdictional statutes to comport
with due process.4 7  Under the Court's new analysis, the traditional
due process concerns of convenience and fairness to the defendant
are subordinated to the "principles of interstate federalism embodied
in the Constitution." '  The Court noted that
[elven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to
the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instru-
ment of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
State of its power to render a valid judgement.19
According to Justice Brennan, "[t]he Court's analysis . . . excludes
jurisdiction in a contiguous State . . . as surely as in more distant
States." '
If Justice Brennan is correct in his evaluation of World-Wide Volks-
wagen, state courts will find it more difficult to acquire jurisdiction
over individuals not present within the state and businesses not doing
business within the boundaries of the state."1 By forcing plaintiffs to
mination of jurisdictional issues. This new analysis places more emphasis on state
sovereignty than on considerations of fairness and convenience. In so doing, it sub-
ordinates the most progressive theory of the post-International Shoe jurisdictional
era, that of 'interstate venue' or 'center-of-gravity,' to considerations of state
sovereignty. The 'interstate venue' theory looked to a complex of factors such as
convenience to the plaintiff and defendant, the interest of the forum, the location of
witnesses, and the choice of substantive law. The present Court looks to a much
narrower question: the quantity and quality of the relations of the particular defen-
dant with the forum state." Kamp, supra note 13, at 29. Hence, "[t]he practical
result . . . can be termed a plaintiffs hell and a defendant's paradise." Id. at 53.
46. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
47. See note 4 supra.
48. 444 U.S. at 293. This analysis has been sharply criticized. E.g., Kamp, supra
note 13, at 53 (The Court's analysis "ignores present economic and social reality.");
An Effect Test, supra note 14, at 204 (The Court's analysis "disregards its own char-
acterization of the nation as a common market . . . and it ignores . . . commercial
realities.") (footnote omitted); 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 531, 539 (1980) ("The Court's
espousal of principles of federalism to deny jurisdiction rests upon previously dis-
carded nineteenth century legal thought and emphasizes form at the expense of indi-
vidual rights.").
49. 444 U.S. at 294; accord, Roger N. Joyce & Assocs. v. Paoli Steel Corp., 491
F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Basham v. Hendee, 614 P.2d 87, 90 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1980).
50. 444 U.S. at 306 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Under the Court's new
analysis, state lines can become barriers to jurisdiction in situations where jurisdic-
tion could be obtained under an analysis based solely on questions of convenience."
Kamp, supra note 13, at 47.
51. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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travel to the defendant, World-Wide Volkswagen will, in many cases,
result in many injuries remaining uncompensated because the litiga-
tion expenses are too great.' For example, this will have a signifi-
cant impact in products liability actions." Arguably, World-Wide
Volkswagen requires that a retailer or distributor, sued under a
theory of products liability, actually have sold the defective goods in
the forum state to be subject to its jurisdiction.' Thus, corporations
will be encouraged to limit their physical and economic presence in
as many jurisdictions as feasible, thereby causing "an attendant de-
cline in the attractiveness of the products liability approach.""
52. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 244; Kamp, supra
note 13, at 53; Payne, supra note 36, at 10295; 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 531, 538 n.52
(1980). The practical result of forcing the plaintiff to travel to the defendant will be
the "preclusion of any relief." Note, Long Ann Wrestling in Pennsylvania: In Search
of a Satisfying Answer to In Personam Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases, 33 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 839, 839 (1972).
53. One rationale for the enactment of long-arm statutes was to provide a
convenient forum for the state's citizens in product liability actions. Note, In Perso.
nam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63
Mich. L. Rev. 1028, 1028 (1965); An Effect Test, supra note 14. at 197. "This need
has certainly not abated; if anything it has increased." Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
This need prompted Congress to enact the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2051-2081 (1976).
54. World-Wide Volkswagen was a products liability action. See note 13 supra.
The Court rejected the assertion of jurisdiction based upon "'the fortuitous circum-
stance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, hap-
pened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma." World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 295. The Court stated that, to be subject to a
State's jurisdiction, a defendant must have "'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the pri-
vilege of conducting activities within the forum State."' Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Therefore, "if the sale of a [defendant's] prod-
uct ... arises from [its] efforts ... to serve ... the market ... in other States, it is
not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States." Id. at 297. (emphasis
added). Hence, the forum state will no longer be able to exert jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant retailer or distributor on the basis of an accident occurring
within the forum state, caused by a defective product sold by the defendant outside
the forum state. See Donnelly v. Copeland Intra Lenses, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 80, 85
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Long v. The Vessel "Miss Ida Ann," 490 F. Supp. 210. 213 n.1
(S.D. Tex. 1980); Gertler v. Gondola Ski Shop, Inc., 384 So. 2d 856, 859 (La. Ct.
App. 1980); State ex rel. Caine v. Richardson, 600 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980); An Effect Test, supra note 14, at 196; Federalism, supra note 14, at 1360
n.146. "In short, the Court has significantly limited jurisdiction over nonresident
dealers and distributors and has raised serious questions about jurisdiction over
nonresident manufacturers." Kamp, supra note 13, at 51; see Payne, supra note 36,
at 1030; 14 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1169, 1184 (1980).
55. Payne, supra note 36, at 1030. "Amidst the growing concern for consumers
in products liability actions, World-Wide is clearly a step backward from the once-
progressive consumer protection movement. The nation's increased consumption
habits and product mobility increase the likelihood that a product will be taken out
of the state where purchased. World-Wide may prevent the consumer from obtaining
recourse in an affordable manner." 49 U. Mo.-K.C. L. Rev. 78, 87 (1980): accord, 30
Drake L. Rev. 171, 177 (1980).
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World-Wide Volkswagen will also impede multi-party litigation. ,, It
is a policy of our judicial system to dispose of multi-party disputes in
one suit,57 an objective facilitated by long-arm statutes.5- World-Wide
Volkswagen's limitation on long-arm statutes will exacerbate the diffi-
culties encountered in attempting to obtain jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent third parties because it will
create many situations in which all the persons who should be
made parties to the lawsuit cannot be joined. This defeats econom-
ical administration of the judicial process and can lead to inconsis-
tent results. It will also, in some instances, lead to dismissals of
actions for failure to join an indispensable party."
The problems caused by multi-party, interstate lawsuits are en-
countered in federal courts as well. 6° Prior to 1963, a federal court
could exercise jurisdiction only over defendants present within the
state in which the court sat.6" Due to the increased incidence of
multi-party litigation, eased communication and travel, and the prob-
56. Kamp, supra note 13, at 53-54. "[In actions where the plaintiff must obtain
personal jurisdiction over two or more parties, he may find that there is no single
state in which they are all subject to in personam jurisdiction .... If, however, the
potential defendants are 'indispensable,' the plaintiff may not proceed against them
separately; if no state can exercise personal jurisdiction over all of them the plaintiff
can not obtain legal relief." Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction in Multiple-Party
Suits, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 643, 643-44 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
57. "To permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues
are simultaneously pending in different . . . [c]ourts leads to . . . wastefulness in
time, energy and money." Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26
(1960); 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1068, at 244; Forde, supra note
29, at 1-2; Kamp, The Shrinking Forum: The Supreme Court's Limitation of
Jurisdiction-An Argument for a Federal Forum in Multi-Party, Multi-State Litiga-
tion, 21 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 161, 161 (1979).
58. See note 41 supra.
59. Kamp, supra note 13, at 53 (footnotes omitted). "The Court's heavy reliance
on the minimum contacts test obviated consideration of judicial economy [because]
consolidating the cases in one court would conserve judicial time .... The
[plaintiffs] will be deprived of the tactical advantages that come from having all the
defendants in the litigation at one time." 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 531, 538 n.52, 539
(1980) (footnote omitted); see Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction after
Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 20 Ariz. L. Rev. 861, 911 (1978).
60. "Modem transactions tend to involve more than the standard two parties and
refuse to confine themselves to a single state or to any narrow area. Multiparty litiga-
tion is ever becoming more common in the federal courts, and it is clear that existing
law imposing territorial limits on effective service . . . will have to be thoroughly
overhauled if this litigation is to be handled effectively." Kaplan, Amendments of te
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963(1), 77 Han'. L. Rev. 601, 629 (1964).
61. As originally promulgated, Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provided that "[a]ll process . . . may be served anywhere within the territorial limits
of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of the United
States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state." See Vestal, Expanding
JURISDICTIONAL COMPACTS
lems inherent in multi-state metropolitan districts, however, the Su-
preme Court chose to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.,-"
In 1963, it amended Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to allow service of process upon certain joined parties outside the
forum state, as long as service occurs less than 100 miles from the
place of trial.6 Thus, in shaping the jurisdiction of federal courts,
the problem engendered by jurisdictional boundaries was recognized
and Rule 4(f) was enacted to remedy it. Although state courts face
similar problems, they have no such jurisdictional supplement.
II. THE INTERSTATE COMPACT CLAUSE: A SUPPLEMENT
FOR STATE COURT JURISDICTION
A. Interstate Compacts and Jurisdiction
The problem of obtaining jurisdiction over absent defendants can
be partially alleviated if contiguous states enact compacts providing
that, for jurisdictional purposes, the territorial boundaries of each
state will be deemed to encompass all of the territory of the other. '
This would increase the jurisdictional reach of each of the compacting
states by widening the boundaries of the geographic area in which
the requisite minimum contacts could occur. Although the Compact
Clause has never been used to create concurrent jurisdiction on such
a large scale, there is no prohibition against using the clause in this
manner.
Interstate compacts have already been used on a limited scale to
create areas of concurrent jurisdiction between contiguous states. For
the Jurisdictional Reach of the Federal Courts: The 1963 Changes in Federal Rule 4,
38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1053, 1059 & n.36 (1963). The only exceptions involve subpoena
power and a few federal questions. Id.
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(), Advisory Committee Notes. "'In the light of present-day
facilities for communication and travel, the territorial range of the service allowed
... can hardly work hardship on the parties summoned. The provision will be espe-
cially useful in metropolitan areas spanning more than one State." Id.
63. Currently, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4() provides, in pertinent part, that "[all process
other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the
state in which the district court is held .... In addition, persons who are brought
in ... pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional parties to a pending action or a counter-
claim or cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19, may be served ... at all places
outside the state but within the United States that are not more than 100 miles from
the place in which the action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred
for trial." Id.; see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 24, § 1124, at 517. See
generally Kaplan, supra note 60, at 629-35; Vestal, supra note 54, at 1059-71.
64. For such a proposal to become law, two states would have to agree to the
compact, which would then be submitted to their respective legislatures for approv-
al. The legislatures could also consent in advance to any compact the designated
negotiators might agree on. If the legislatures both ratified the compact, it would
then be submitted to Congress. When Congress assented, the compact would be
law. See Since 1925, supra note 1, at 35; A Survey, supra note 1, at 326.
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example, the Virginia Compact of 1789 provided that the jurisdiction
of Kentucky would be concurrent with that of any state that might be
created on the opposite shore.' Similarly, in 1834, New York and
New Jersey agreed by interstate compact to extend New York's crim-
inal jurisdiction into that part of New Jersey that included the Hud-
son River and New York Harbor and also to make service of process
by either state effective anywhere on the Harbor. " These compacts
create areas of concurrent jurisdiction by literally extending the
boundaries of the party states so as to include a small parcel of the
other state's territory.67
Although these instances of concurrent jurisdiction have been lim-
ited to boundary waters between adjoining states, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the concept must be so limited. In fact, states,
through interstate compacts, have projected their judicial power into
the territory of another state. In 1953, following public exposure of
65. Virginia Act of December 18, 1789, 13 Hening Va. Stat. at L. 17, reprinted
in Kentucky Statute Revision Committee, Notes and Annotations to the Kentucky
Revised Statutes, xxiv-vi (1944) [hereinafter cited as Notes and Annotations]. The
Virginia Compact was accepted by Kentucky and inserted into its first three constitu-
tions. Ky. Const. of 1792, art. 8, § 7, reprinted in Notes and Annotations, supra, at
xxxiv; Ky. Const. of 1799, art. 6, § 9, reprinted in Notes and Annotations, supra, at
xlvi; Ky. Const. of 1850, art. 8, § 9, reprinted in Notes and Annotations, supra, at
lxiii. Congress consented by the Act of February 4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189, admit-
ting Kentucky to the Union. Hence, the jurisdiction of Kentucky over the Ohio
River is concurrent with that of Indiana and West Virginia. See, e.g., Nicoulin v.
O'Brien, 248 U.S. 113, 114 (1918); Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573, 573, 582
(1904); Inland Barge Co. v. Nasbitt, 210 F. Supp. 690, 691 (S.D. Ind. 1962); Sher-
lock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184, 191 (1873), affd, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Carlisle v. State, 32
Ind. 55, 56 (1869); State v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 124, 46 S.E. 269, 271 (1903).
Similarly, The New Jersey and Delaware Compact of 1905 provided for concurrent
jurisdiction over the Delaware River. The agreement was ratified by Delaware on
March 20, 1905, 23 Del. Laws, ch. 5, and by New Jersey on March 21, 1905, 1905
N.J. Laws, ch. 42, as amended by 1907 N.J. Laws, ch. 131; see New Jersey v.
Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1934).
66. The New York-New Jersey Compact of 1834 was ratified by New York on
February 16, 1834, 1834 N.Y. Laws, ch. 8, and by New Jersey on February 5, 1834,
1833-1834 N.J. Laws, at 118. Congress consented by the Act of June 28, 1834, ch,
125, 4 Stat. 708; see Central R.R. v. Jersey City, 209 U.S. 473, 478 (1908); New
York Cent. R.R. v. State Dep't of Taxation, 137 N.J.L. 288, 295, 59 A.2d 859, 862
(1948), affd sub nom. Erie R.R. v. State Dep't of Taxation, 1 N.J. 298, 63 A.2d 268
(1949) (per curiam); In re Gutkowski's Estate, 135 N.J. Eq. 93, 99, 33 A.2d 361, 366
(Perog. Ct. 1943); Ross v. Mayor of Edgewater, 115 N.J.L. 477, 482, 180 A. 866, 869
(1935), aff'd per curiam, 116 N.J.L. 447, 184 A, 810, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 543
(1936); Ferguson v. Ross. 126 N.Y. 459, 462-67, 27 N.E. 954, 954 (1891); Kowalskic
v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700-01 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
67. Dean, Interstate Compact for Crime Control, 21 A.B.A.J. 89, 89-90 (1935);
Zimmermann, Wendell & Heller, Effective Interpleader via Interstate Compacts, 55
Colum. L. Rev. 56, 62 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Effective Interpleader]; Legal
Problems, supra note 1, at 625-26.
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racketeering activity on the waterfront, New York and New Jersey
agreed to the Waterfront Commission Compact.' The Compact pro-
vided the Commission with the power to subpoena witnesses.' The
Commission, which sat in New York, subpoenaed two New Jersey
residents, who failed to appear.' These residents maintained that it
was a denial of due process to force a person to go beyond the limits
of his own state to testify in another jurisdiction.' Rejecting this argu-
ment, the court in In re Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor72 upheld the constitutionality of the compact, noting that
such a jurisdictional extension is permissible upon agreement of the
party states.3
Another such compact is the Interstate Compact for the Supervi-
sion of Parolees and Probationers.-" This compact, adopted by all 50
states, provides for the supervision of parolees and probationers in
states outside the state of conviction.' The power of a state over
these individuals is derived solely from the jurisdiction of the sen-
tencing court. 6 The compact extends the jurisdiction of the sentenc-
68. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-1 to :23-113 (West 1963). N.Y. Unconsol. Laws (65)
§§ 9801-10051 (McKinney 1974); Congress consented by the Act of August 12, 1953.
Pub. L. No. 83-252, 67 Stat. 541. See also Waterfront Comm'n v. International
Longshoreman's Ass'n, 208 Misc. 554, 556-57, 144 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
69. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-10(8) (West 1963); N.Y. Unconsol. Laws (651 §981018)
(McKinney 1974).
70. In re Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor. 39 N.J. Super. 33. 3S-39,
120 A.2d 504, 507 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1956).
71. Id. at 43, 120 A.2d at 509.
72. 39 N.J. Super 33, 120 A.2d 504 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1956).
73. "It is, therefore, manifest that the two states have been joined by agreement
to eliminate the territorial and jurisdictional boundary between them .... - Id. at
41, 120 A.2d at 508.
74. Congress consented in advance to compacts between states "for cooperative
effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime" in 1934. 4 U S.C. § 112(a)
(1976). Pursuant to this authority all 50 states eventually ratified the Interstate Com-
pact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers. Burkhart. Interstate Coopera-
tion in Probation and Parole, Fed. Probation, June 1960, at 24. The Compact was
conceived in 1935 by the Interstate Commission on Crime and %',Is promulgated in
recognition of the interstate character of crime and crime control. Id. The Compact
was created so that parolees could move to another state where "due to family rela-
tionships . . .better opportunities for work and a more conducive atmosphere for
rehabilitation will be found .... But the rehabilitative value of such a move would
often be lost unless there is adequate supervision, advice, and assistance to accom-
pany the released person when he crosses the state line." Crihfield, The Interstate
Parole and Probation Compact, Fed. Probation, June 1953. at 3. The Compact has
been upheld on constitutional grounds numerous times. Gulley v. Apple. 213 Ark.
350, 356, 210 S.W.2d 514, 519 (1948); In re Tenner. 20 Cal. 2d 670. 674, 128 P.2d
338, 343 (1942) (en banc); Pierce v. Smith, 31 Wash. 2d 52, 5S-59. 195 P.2d 112.
116, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 834 (1948).




ing court and thus makes it possible for supervision to proceed out-
side the state of conviction.'
In 1957, the New York legislature enacted the Interstate Inter-
pleader Compact,"8 which was subsequently adopted by four other
states.7" The compact provides that, in interstate interpleader ac-
tions, "[s]ervice of process sufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction
may be made within a state party to this compact, by a person who
institutes an interpleader proceeding . . . in another state, party to
this compact."0 The compact was designed to eliminate the problem
of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident claimants in state inter-
pleader actions.8' Although this compact was never consented to by
Congress, and hence, never became effective,82 there was no question
as to its constitutional validity.8 It was not approved because the
enactment of long-arm statutes, as well as the availability of federal
inteipleader procedures, made the compact "less necessary than it
might have been formerly."
The Interstate Interpleader Compact, the Waterfront Commission
Compact, and the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees
and Probationers operate on the same basic principles. Pursuant to
such compacts, and with the consent of Congress, states can subject
their citizens and businesses to the judicial authority of another
state." Territorial constraints on the exercise of judicial power do
77. Id.
78. 1957 N.Y. Laws, ch. 775, as amended by 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 237. See
generally L. Prashker & R. Trapani, New York Practice § 291 (1959); 2 J. Weinstein,
H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice 1008.07 (1980); Effective Inter-
pleader, supra note 67, at 56-71; 58 Mich. L. Rev. 612, 612-14 (1960).
79. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 6351-6358 (1964); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
2A: 41A-1 to -3 (West Supp. 1980); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 7521-7524 (Purdon
1980).
80. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 6353(1) (1964).
81. Interpleader is a technique developed to solve the problem of a stakeholder
who is subject to multiple claims for an obligation that is rightfully owed to just one
of the claimants. Effective Interpleader, supra note 67, at 56. See generally Rogers,
Historical Origins of Interpleader, 51 Yale L.J. 924 (1942). If the stakeholder is un-
able to obtain jurisdiction over all the claimants, however, he may be subject to
multiple liability. 105 Cong. Rec. 12547 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Keating); 58 Mich.
L. Rev. 612, 612 n.3 (1960); see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunleavy, 241 U.S. 518
(1916).
82. J. Weinstein, H. Korn, & A. Miller, supra note 78, 1006.07; McLaughlin,
Practice Commentaries to N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1006, at C1006:8 (McKinney 1976);
58 Mich. L. Rev. 612, 612 (1960).
83. L. Prashker & S. Trapani, supra note 78, § 291. at 541-43; J. Weinstein, H.
Korn & A. Miller, supra note 78, 1006.07; McLaughlin, supra note 82, at C1006:8;
Effective Interpleader, supra note 67, at 56-71; 58 Mich. L. Rev. 612, 612-14 (1960).
84. J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 78, 1006.07.
85. L. Prashker & S. Trapani, supra note 78, at 542; Effective Interpleader, su-
pra note 67, at 62; Legal Problems, supra note 1, at 625-26.
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not apply to the "joint action of two or more states taken by interstate
compact."' This rationale clearly establishes that states can compact
to share their jurisdiction with other states.
B. Due Process Considerations
Although Article I, § 10 lists congressional consent as the sole
limitation on interstate compacts,s' compacts must still satisfy the re-
quirements of the Constitution, including the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." It might be posited that a jurisdic-
tional compact would be unconstitutional because a defendant could
be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state with which he has had
absolutely no contacts. Jurisdiction under such a compact, however,
would still have to fulfill the minimum contacts requirement, but the
boundaries of the area in which the contacts could occur would be
greatly increased. In this respect, the effect of a jurisdictional com-
pact would be analogous to the effect of the 100-mile bulge provision
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Under Rule 4(0, if a third-
party defendant has meaningful contacts within the 100-mile bulge,
the court can exercise jurisdiction over him, even if he had no con-
tacts whatsoever with the forum state. 9°
Moreover, the analysis of the underlying rationale for the minimum
contacts standard articulated by the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
indicates that properly drafted jurisdictional compacts could comport
with due process. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that
the minimum contacts requirement serves to protect two due process
concerns. "It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits im-
posed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
86. Effective Interpleader, supra note 67, at 62.
87. See note 2 supra.
88. See Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th
Cir. 1977); Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 902 (1962); State v. Joslin, 116 Kan. 615, 618, 227 P. 543. 544 (1924); Legal
Problems, supra note 1, at 619; A Survey, supra note 1. at 326; 37 Mich. L. Rev.
129, 131 n.12 (1938).
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(o.
90. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1979); Coleman v.
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1968); Pillsbury
Co. v. Delta Boat & Barge Rental, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 630, 632 (E.D. La. 1976); Spear-
ing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)- McCo-
nigle v. Penn-Central Transp. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58, 62-63 (D. Md. 1969); Sevits v.
McKiernan-Terry Corp., 270 F. Supp. 887, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kaplan, supra note
60, at 633. But see Deloro Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Engelhard Minerals & Chem.




system." 9' A jurisdictional compact could comply with the conve-
nience factor underlying minimum contacts by limiting the compact
to adjoining states. Certainly, traveling to a contiguous state is not
much of a burden in many cases. "In fact, a courtroom just across the
state line from a defendant may be far more convenient for the
defendant than a courtroom in a distant corner of his own State." '
To further minimize the inconvenience created by being forced to
defend an out of state law suit, jurisdictional compacts should include
venue provisions. These would differ with the geographic characteris-
tics of the compacting states. For example, a typical venue provision
could require a plaintiff, seeking jurisdiction under the compact, to
bring his suit in specified judicial districts located near the state line,
thereby minimizing the inconvenience to the out of state defendant.
The second rationale underlying minimum contacts protects the
status of the states as "coequal sovereigns in a federal system.", ° The
Court stressed that the Framers of the Constitution "intended that
the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty,"' including
the power to try cases. The sovereignty of one state requires a limita-
tion on the sovereignty of all the other states. Consequently, when
one state exercises long arm jurisdiction over a defendant present in
another state, it infringes the latter's sovereignty by unilaterally sub-
jecting that defendant to its judicial authority. Jurisdictional com-
pacts, however, would be consensual arrangements. Each of the corn-
pacting states would agree to share its jurisdictional authority with
the other.
Moreover, another attribute of state sovereignty is the constitu-
tionally provided right to compact with other states." In upholding a
multistate tax compact, the Supreme Court noted that
[t]he Constitution did not purport to exhaust imagination and re-
sourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships. It is not
91. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see
Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 121 (1980); Quaker Oats Co. v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 496 F. Supp. 85, 86 n.1
(N.D. I11. 1980); Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 46, 47 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); Royal Bank of Canada v. Trebtham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404, 406 (S.D.
Tex. 1980); Lieb v. American Pac. Int'l, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 690, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
92. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 n.1 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Kamp, supra note 13, at 37.
93. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292 (1980).
94. Id. at 293.
95. The right to compact is "a power inherent in sovereignty limited only to the
extent that congressional consent is required." West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,
341 U.S. 22, 35 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725 (1838); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837).
"As a matter of political theory, the compact is an ideal compromise with the doctrin-
al pattern of the Constitution, for it offers a technique for satisfying certain generally
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to be construed to limit the variety of arrangements which are
possible through the voluntary and cooperative actions of indi-
vidual States with a view to increasing harmony within the federal-
ism created by the Constitution.*
Jurisdictional compacts, by furthering legitimate state interests
such as the forum state's interest in adjudicating disputes,' and the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,- would
also promote harmony among the states without damaging the federal
structure created by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Jurisdictional compacts cannot replace long arm statutes. Compacts
between contiguous states, however, would enable courts to exercise
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who would not have been
subject to conventional long-arm jurisdiction. By erasing arbitrary
barriers to state judicial authority, jurisdictional compacts would en-
hance the efficient operation of our judicial system.
Mark C. Smith
shared social ambitions without distorting the federal structure of multiple
sovereignty." Practical Problems, supra note 2, at 326-27.
96. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 470
(1978) (quoting New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959)).
97. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
98. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Kulko
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